Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

FACTS
ROCKETS LAUNCHED FROM LEBANON. According to reports, at least three Katyusha rockets were fired today from Southern Lebanon into Northern Israel. One landed in the kitchen of an old age home in Nahariya, wounding two elderly Israelis. Israel immediately responded by firing artillery shells at the location from which the Katyushas were fired. An Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) spokesman told Haaretz that the retaliation was intended as a “pinpoint response at the source of fire.”
LEBANON’S RESPONSE. The Lebanese government was quick to condemn the rocket attacks into Israel. According to a statement released by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s office: “Prime Minister Siniora regards what happened in the south as a violation of the international resolution 1701 and something he does not accept and Siniora called for an investigation into the incident.”
WHO BEARS RESPONSIBILITY? No group or individual has, to this point, claimed responsibility for the Katyusha attacks. Lebanese Information Minister Tarek Mitri was swift to deny Hizballah’s role, saying that the group “assured the Lebanese government that it remains engaged in preserving the stability in Lebanon and respects Security Council resolution 1701.” Israel blamed Palestinian factions in Lebanon, and does not believe this signals a broader escalation. Minister Rafi Eitan said, “I think these are isolated incidents. We expected this.” FDD research fellow Tony Badran writes that the Damascus-based PFLP-GC is believed responsible for the rocket attacks, and that Hizballah “naturally knew about it and turned a blind eye, in order to conveniently maintain deniability.”
ANALYSIS
HIZBALLAH’S RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE? Hizballah’s denial of responsibility for the rocket attacks is consistent with prior statements from the militant group indicating that it does not want to engage Israel in a full-out war. Even though Hizballah Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah described the July 2006 war with Israel as a “divine victory,” the combat was in fact incredibly costly to Hizballah militarily. In a comprehensive article in the Winter 2009 issue of Middle East Quarterly, Professor Eyal Zisser of Tel Aviv University argues that Hizballah “suffered perhaps US$4 billion damage to its institutions and enterprises.” Most significant from the perspective of Hizballah’s military capabilities, Israel estimates that it “lost about a third of its elite fighting force.” This harmed Hizballah because, while the group has no problem attracting new volunteers, “turning them into skilled military operators is a lengthy and complex process.”
NASRALLAH’S CONCERNS. Nasrallah also has personal safety and political concerns that may be deterring him from engaging Israel. As Zisser notes, the February 2008 assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, for which Nasrallah blamed Israel (Israel has not publicly claimed responsibility) “shattered the legend of Hezbollah’s invincibility.” It made Nasrallah aware that he could meet with a similar fate. On a political level, Hizballah has become more involved in Lebanese politics since the 2006 war, and has gained significant power within Lebanon’s government. It hopes to make significant gains in the June 2009 parliamentary elections. Dragging Lebanon into another devastating conflict could undermine the organization’s political ambitions.
IMPLICATIONS
LESSONS LEARNED FROM 2006. One of Israel’s mistakes in 2006 was responding reflexively to provocations from the north, as detailed in the Winograd Commission report. In contrast, Israel has had a more strategic outlook in the present conflict. They achieved a degree of surprise in their operations into Gaza, and have thus far been measured in responding to the dangers emanating from Lebanon.
HIZBALLAH MAY YET BECOME INVOLVED. Despite the points of deterrence discussed above, Hizballah could still become involved in the current conflict if tensions on Israel’s northern border increase. On Wednesday, Nasrallah stated: “We are prepared for every possibility and are ready for all aggression…. The Zionists will discover that the war they had in July was a walk in the park if we compare it to what we’ve prepared for every new aggression.” However, the reserved nature of Israel’s response and statements following the Katyusha attacks makes it unlikely that the conflict will escalate at this point.